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THE KOREA FAIR TRADE COMMISSION’S DECISION 
ON MICROSOFT’S TYING PRACTICE: THE SECOND-
BEST REMEDY FOR HARMED COMPETITORS 
Sejin Kim† 
Abstract: In the spring of 2006, the Korea Fair Trade Commission (“KFTC”) 
imposed a fine of approximately thirty-one million dollars and a cease-and-desist order 
against Microsoft Corporation (“Microsoft”) for bundling its Windows Media Service 
(“WMS”), Windows Media Player (“WMP”), and Windows Messenger (“WM”) into its 
personal computer operating system “Windows.”  Specifically, the KFTC ordered 
Microsoft to completely separate WMS from Windows and provide two different 
versions of Windows: one bundled with WMP and WM and the other without these two 
programs.  It is also noteworthy that the KFTC required Microsoft to include the 
“Media/Messenger Centre” in the bundled version to help users download competing 
media players and instant messengers. 
Yet, the KFTC’s requirement still seems imperfect because most end-users become 
wedded to Microsoft’s application programs to which they are exposed first.  Instead, the 
KFTC could have imposed a “must-carry” obligation which requires installation of other 
competing media players and messaging programs as the default in Windows.  Among 
various remedial options available, the must-carry requirement against Microsoft could 
be the most effective way to give Windows users fully equal access to competing 
products.  But many practical difficulties, such as increased costs due to potential legal 
and economic problems exist in providing such equal accessibility through the must-carry 
option.  Thus, the KFTC’s “Media/Messenger Center” requirement, which is expected to 
create similar (but still not equal) accessibility as the must-carry obligation, was an 
appropriate alternative as the next best option for the KFTC. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Microsoft Corporation (“Microsoft”), one of the biggest software 
companies in the world, is recognized as the “Great White Whale” of 
antitrust across the world, particularly in the U.S. and Europe. 1  
Unfortunately, it could not stay away from the spear thrown by the Korean 
government’s antitrust watchdog, the Korea Fair Trade Commission 
(“KFTC”).  On December 7, 2005, the KFTC reached a decision which 
ordered both Microsoft and Microsoft Korea 2  to unbundle their tied 
products, including Windows Media Player (“WMP”), from Windows 
operating system (“Windows”), and imposed a fine of approximately thirty-
                                                 
†  Juris Doctor expected in 2008, University of Washington School of Law.  The author would like 
to thank Professor Yong-Sung (Jonathan) Kang for his guidance and suggestions on this Comment.  The 
author would also like to thank the editorial staff of the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal for their hard 
work and commitment.  Any errors or omissions are solely attributable to this author.  
1  Randal C. Picker, Unbundling Scope-of-Permission Goods: When Should We Invest in Reducing 
Entry Barriers?, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 189, 197 (2005). 
2   The Korean branch of Microsoft Corporation. 
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three billion won (equivalent to approximately thirty-one million U.S. 
dollars) for the violation of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act 
(“MRFTA”).3  Microsoft appealed this decision, but the KFTC dismissed it 
without merit on June 6, 2006. 4   Similarly, the European Commission 
(“E.C.”) held that Microsoft violated the E.C. treaty by bundling WMP to 
Windows.5  The KFTC’s decision is regarded as more stringent than that of 
the E.C. because of the types of corrective measures imposed.6 
The purpose of this Comment is to provide an in-depth inquiry into 
the effectiveness of the KFTC’s corrective measures to remedy harms 
caused to competitors by Microsoft’s illegal tying practices.  Section II of 
this comment introduces Korean antitrust laws and the functions of the 
KFTC.  Section III summarizes the structure of the KFTC’s decision and 
application of antitrust laws.  Section IV examines the effectiveness of the 
remedies adopted by the E.C. and the U.S. that the KFTC considered in 
forming its own remedial measures.  Section V evaluates the KFTC’s current 
remedies by examining and comparing several options that the KFTC could 
have adopted. 
This comment will cross-reference pertinent sections of the KFTC’s 
decision translated into English by this author. 
II. THE MRFTA IS KOREA’S CORE ANTITRUST REGULATION  
The MRFTA 7  is Korea’s core legislation designed exclusively to 
govern competition law and policy.8  The MRFTA has fourteen chapters, 
seventy-one articles and some addenda.  The Act encompasses every 
                                                 
3  마이크로소프트 코퍼레이션 및 한국마이크로소프트 유한회사의 시장지배적 지위남용행위 
등에 대한 건 [In the Matter of the Abuse of Market Dominant Position of Microsoft Corporation and 
Microsoft Korea ], (2002경촉 0453, 2005경촉 0375) [2002 Kyung-Chok 0453, 2005 Kyung-Chok 0375], 
Korean Fair Trade Commission (2006) (S.Korea), available at http://ftc.go.kr/data/hwp/ 
case/20060217_9653.hwp [hereinafter Microsoft Decision].  In this article, I first provide an analysis of the 
relevant legal and historical context of this case, followed by my translation of the decision.  Here, I only 
translated the “holding” section of the decision.  The whole decision is 266 pages long in the original 
language, 16 pages of which were dedicated to the holding. 
4
  마이크로소프트 코퍼레이션 및 한국 마이크로소프트 유한회사의 이의신청에 대한 건[In 
the Matter of the Appeal from Microsoft Corporation and Microsoft Korea], 2006심이 1163 [Case No. 
2006 Sim-Yi 1163] (2006) (S.Korea), available at http://ftc.go.kr/data/hwp/case/ 
20060529181129449_.hwp.). 
5  Case COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft, Commission Decision of March 24, 2004, available at http:// 
europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/37792/en.pdf [hereinafter Commission Decision].  
6  Youngjin Jung & Seung-Wha Chang, Korea's Competition Law and Policies in Perspective, 26 
NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 687, 696 (2006). 
7  독점규제 및 공정거래에 관한 법률[Monopoly Regualtion and Fair Trade Act], Statutes of 
South Korea, Act No. 7796, (1961) (last amended on Dec. 29, 2005 ) (S. Korea). 
8  Jung & Chang, supra note 6, at 696. 
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traditional subject of competition law, including anti-competitive mergers, 
cartels, monopolizations, resale price maintenances, and exclusive dealing 
arrangements.9 
The MRFTA is primarily enforced by government agencies, especially 
the KFTC which functions as a quasi-judicial body operating under the 
executive authority of the Prime Minister. 10   The KFTC consists of a 
committee of nine commissioners (the decision-making body) and a 
secretariat (a working body).11 
The KFTC’s case proceedings are composed of two stages: 
examination and deliberation. 12   The examination stage begins when a 
competition law violation is reported.13  The KFTC begins the examination 
process by investigating relevant documents, consulting with experts, 
conducting legal reviews, and so forth.14  If the examiner concludes that 
legal measures are necessary, the KFTC’s commissioners begin review of 
the reports, opinions, and other documents submitted by the examinees.15  
The examinees may express their opinions directly or indirectly through 
their respective legal counsels throughout the deliberation processes.16  If a 
violation is duly recognized by the commissioners, the KFTC imposes 
corrective measures such as cease-and-desist orders and fines.17  Once the 
KFTC imposes corrective measures, the parties who are allegedly aggrieved 
by the measures can file a private lawsuit in a court only after the KFTC 
finalizes its proceedings.18 
III. THE KFTC DECISION HELD THAT MICROSOFT’S TYING PRACTICES 
VIOLATED THE MRFTA  
In a decision published on February 2006, the KFTC fined Microsoft 
approximately thirty-one million dollars and required it to completely 
separate WMS from Windows.19  The KFTC also required Microsoft to 
provide two separate versions of Windows: one bundled with WMP plus 
WM and the other without those two programs.20  It is noteworthy that the 
                                                 
9  Id. 
10  Id. at 109. 
11  About KFTC, Korea Fair Trade Commission, http://www.ftc.go.kr/eng (last visited Oct. 27, 2006). 
12  Id. 
13  Id.  
14  Id. 
15   Id. 
16   Id. 
17   Id. 
18   Jung & Chang, supra note 6, at 710. 
19   Microsoft Decision, supra note 3, at 12. 
20   Id. at 3-4. 
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bundled version had to contain the “Media/Messenger Centre” that helps 
users download competing media players and instant messengers.21 
A. The KFTC Made Three Distinct Findings in its Microsoft Decision 
In its decision, the KFTC reviewed three issues concerning 
Microsoft’s illegal tying: 1) Microsoft’s practice of tying WMS to the 
Windows, 2) Microsoft’s tie-in of WMP to Windows, and 3) Microsoft’s 
practice of tying its instant messaging program, WM, to Windows.22  The 
KFTC found that Microsoft’s practice of tying these three products to the 
Windows operating system violated the MRFTA.23 
The KFTC made three findings on Microsoft’s violation of MRFTA in 
its decision.  First, the KFTC found that Microsoft’s conduct “unreasonably 
interfere[d] with the business activities of other enterprisers.”24  According 
to the decision, its tie-in practices forced other enterprisers of similar 
products to engage in trades and conduct that unfairly disadvantaged them.25  
Second, the KFTC found that Microsoft “considerably harm[ed] the interests 
of consumers.”26  The KFTC supported this finding by noting that Microsoft 
1) raised the entry barrier to the media server program market, restricting 
market competition and obstructing consumers’ welfare; 2) infringed upon 
consumers’ right to choose media server programs (here, referring to medial 
players and instant messengers); and 3) harmed consumers’ interests by 
reducing technology development arising from decreased competition. 27  
Lastly, the KFTC found that Microsoft “unfairly coerce[d] or induc[ed] 
customers of competitors to deal with [it].”28  The KFTC’s decision indicates 
that while Microsoft provided certain products to the counterpart 
enterprisers, it forced them to buy its other products too.  Thus, Microsoft’s 
conduct was regarded as harmful to fair trade.29 
                                                 
21  Id. at 5-6. 
22   See generally Microsoft Decision, supra note 3. 
23  Id. at 76, 157, 226-27. 
24  See Microsoft Decision, supra note 3, at 76, 157, 226-27; MRFTA, supra note 7, at art. 3-2, § 1(1).  
25  See Microsoft Decision, supra note 3, at 76, 157, 226-27; MRFTA, supra note 7, at art. 3-2, § 1(3). 
26  See Microsoft Decision, supra note 3, at 76, 157, 226-27; MRFTA, supra note 7, at art. 3-2, § 1(5). 
27  See Microsoft Decision, supra note 3, at 76, 157, 226-27. 
28  Id.; MRFTA, supra note 7, at art. 23, § 1(3), art. 36, § 1(5). 
29  Microsoft Decision, supra, note 3 at 76, 157, 226-27. 
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B. The KFTC Imposed Corrective Measures and Surcharges Against 
Microsoft 
After finding that Microsoft violated the MRFTA, the KFTC imposed 
fairly extensive penalties.  Regarding the WMS, the KFTC ordered 
Microsoft to unbundle WMS from Windows Server Operating System 
within 180 days.30  Concerning WMP and WM, Microsoft was required to 
provide two separate versions of Windows: one stripped of WMP/WM and 
the other with newly installed “Media/Messenger Centre” that will contain 
links to web-pages where users can download competing media players and 
instant messengers. 31   For other versions of Windows already sold and 
currently in use by consumers, Microsoft was required to provide the 
“Media/Messenger Centre” through CDs or Internet updates.32  In addition 
to these corrective measures, the KFTC imposed a total of 32.49 billion won 
(approximately thirty-one million U.S. dollars) on both Microsoft 
Corporation and Microsoft Korea Ltd.33 
Microsoft’s tie-in practices of WMS and WM had never undergone 
judicial examination prior to the KFTC’s review.34   On the other hand, 
Microsoft’s tying practice on WMP was examined by the KFTC just one 
year after a similar case was decided by the European Commission (“E.C.”) 
in 2004.  A comparison of similar tying cases in the U.S. and the E.C. sheds 
light on the effectiveness of the KFTC’s sanctions against Microsoft. 
IV. THE UNITED STATES’ AND THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S MICROSOFT 
CASES REVEAL THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF CERTAIN REMEDIES  
There have been many similar antitrust claims across the world 
against Microsoft.35  Although the scope of legal issues claimed against 
Microsoft varies depending on the jurisdiction, courts in the U.S. and Europe 
have commonly handled bundling issues relating to Windows.  Yet, the 
remedies imposed by the U.S. and the E.C. have both proven to be 
ineffective for the harmed competitors of Microsoft as discussed below.  
                                                 
30  Holding of Microsoft Decision, art. 1, § A (translated by this author following this analysis) 
[hereinafter “Holding”]. 
31  Holding at art. 2, §A; art. 2, § C(1). 
32  Id. at art. 2, §D (1)-(3). 
33  Id. at art. 8, §A. 
34  박정원 MS, [Park Jung-Won], 사건에 대한 공정위 시정조치의 내용과 의의 [The Contents and 
Implication of the KFTC’s remedy on the Microsoft Case], 경쟁저널 [COMPETITION JOURNAL], Vol. 125, 
47 (2006) (S.Korea) [hereinafter Park Jung-Won]. 
35  See Picker supra note 1, at 197. 
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Such ineffectiveness was considered by the KFTC in designing its own 
measures.36 
A. The U.S. Court’s Settlement Decree on Antitrust Claims Against 
Microsoft Failed to Alleviate Competitors’ Grievances 
In 2000, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia held that 
Microsoft violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act37 by tying middleware 
products (including the Internet Explorer web-browser and WMP) to its own 
Windows Operating System.38  The court ordered that Microsoft be split into 
two companies, one for selling operating systems and the other for program 
applications. 39   Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia remanded the issue of software packaging under Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act.40  The appellate court indicated that the tying arrangement 
should be assessed under the “rule of reason” while the lower court held that 
the practice was per se illegal under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.41  On the 
other hand, the court affirmed the district court’s ruling that Microsoft 
violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act by its illegal maintenance of a 
monopoly in the market for personal computer operating systems.42 
On remand, negotiations resumed between Microsoft and the 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”), and eventually led to a settlement agreement 
between Microsoft and the government on November 2001.43  The DOJ 
agreed with all the essential parts of Microsoft’s proposal.44  With minor 
modifications, the district court entered the settlement decree as the final 
judgment.45 
The final judgment neither required separate packaging (unbundling) 
nor code removal from Windows.46   However, the decree provided that 
                                                 
36   Park Jung-Won, supra note 34, at 47. 
37  The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 § 2, Pub.L. 101-588, § 4(b), 104 Stat. 2880 (1999) (current 
version at 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2004)). 
38  U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59, 63-64 (D.D.C. 2000), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 253 
F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).  
39  Id. at 63-65. 
40  Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 84. 
41  Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 89-94 (The court indicated that it was not confident that bundling in 
computer software markets had sufficiently negligible “redeeming virtue” as to warrant per se treatment.  
Thus, on remand, the court directed the lower court to see whether the anticompetitive effects of the alleged 
tying practice outweighed Microsoft’s claimed benefits.). 
42  Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 46, 52-54.  
43  United States v. Microsoft Corp., 231 F. Supp. 2d 144, 150 (D.D.C. 2002). 
44  Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 63-65. 
45  Id. at 202-03. 
46  Proposed Final Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement; U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 59 Fed. 
Reg. 42,845, 42855 (Aug. 19, 1994) (detailing the Proposed Final Judgment in U.S. v. Microsoft).  
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Microsoft's licenses with original equipment manufacturers (“OEMs”) for 
Windows not restrict the OEMs’ ability to install or display icons of non-
Microsoft middleware.47  The decree also allowed the OEMs to distribute, 
promote, and launch the non-Microsoft middleware programs.48  Under such 
a remedy, the OEMs could sell computers without visible access, such as 
icons, to middleware (including WMP and Internet Explorer) and could 
make other media players the default installation.49  However, it is notable 
that the underlying code for the middleware would continue to remain on the 
computers shipped and manufactured by the OEMs.50 
Because this federal case was settled without judgment under the 
standard required by the appellate court (“the rule of reason”), the consent 
decree is not subject to the established remedial rule51 of antitrust laws.  
However, based on the fact that the appellate court did recognize the harms 
caused by the tying practice in the browser market, the effectiveness of the 
adopted decree can be evaluated by considering whether it cured the 
recognized harms. 
By making it possible for computer sellers to reduce the visibility of 
software functions such as Internet Explorer, the settlement decree enhanced 
the ability of browser competitors to install their software on the desktop.  
However, the decree however, does not effectively alleviate the problems 
relating to Microsoft’s tying practice.  First, as critics pointed out, because 
the decree allowed commingling Internet Explorer computer codes with 
those of Windows, other competing products, such as Netscape Navigator, 
barely survived. 52   OEMs had “little incentive to install competing 
browsers”, and “developers would have no incentive to write software” that 
                                                 
47 Sue Ann Mota, Hide It or Unbundle It: a Comparison of The Antitrust Investigations Against 
Microsoft in the U.S. and the E.U., 3 PIERCE L. REV. 183, 189 (2005).  See also Wikipedia.com, 
Middleware, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Middleware#_note-0 (last visited Jan. 10, 2007) (“Middleware is 
computer software that connects software components or applications.  It is used most often to support 
complex, distributed applications.  It includes web servers, application servers, content management 
systems, and similar tools that support application development and delivery.  Middleware is especially 
integral to modern information technology based on XML, SOAP, Web services, and service-oriented 
architecture.”). 
48  Sue Ann Mota, supra note 47, at 189 (citing N.Y. v. Microsoft Corp., 244 F.Supp. 2d at 184). 
49  See Microsoft Corp., 231 F. Supp. 2d at 177 (D.D.C. 2002). 
50  See Commission Decision, ¶ 798 (“In particular, the U.S. Judgment does not provide for removal 
of WMP code from the PC operating system.”); ¶ 828 (“Removal of end-users access does not restore the 
choice of Microsoft’s customers as to whether to acquire Windows without WMP.”). 
51  New York v. Microsoft Corporation, 224 F.Supp.2d 76, 96 (The remedial principle in the U.S. is 
quite straightforward: the remedy should “unfetter a market from anticompetitive conduct,” “terminate the 
illegal monopoly,” “deny to the defendant the fruits of its statutory violation, and ensure that there remain 
no practices likely to result in monopolization in the future.”). 
52  Mark Wigfield, Appeals Court Judges Differ on Microsoft Antitrust Issue, DOW JONES BUSINESS 
NEWS, Nov. 4, 2003. 
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was compatible with competing products because Microsoft had integrated 
“more features into Windows.”53  Indeed, after the conclusion of the lawsuit, 
Microsoft gained a monopoly share of the market for web browsers–which it 
did not have at the time of the trial.54 
A remedy that merely requires that icons be hidden but leaves the 
intermingled source codes intact is not meaningful to other competitors.  The 
E.C. seemed to understand that a fundamental problem was caused by the 
remaining software codes.  In response, the E.C. required that Microsoft 
produce an additional version of Windows from which such codes were 
completely removed.  Despite this additional measure, the E.C’s imposed 
penalties did not fully correct the problem caused by Microsoft’s distribution 
advantage in the software market. 
B. The E.C.’s Mandatory Versioning Was Not an Effective Remedy to 
Correct Wrongs Caused by Microsoft’s Tying Practices 
The E.C. found that Microsoft abused its dominant position in the 
personal computer operating system industry in violation of Article 82 of the 
European Commission Treaty. 55   Sun Microsystems, one of Microsoft’s 
competitors in the server software markets, originally filed the complaint at 
the end of 1998.56  The complaint focused on Microsoft’s refusal to supply 
information needed for interoperability with Windows.57   Also, the E.C. 
began, on its own initiative, an investigation focusing on Microsoft’s tying 
practice of WMP into Windows.58  On March 24, 2004, the E.C. rendered its 
decision with corrective measures and fines.59  In the decision, the E.C. 
ordered Microsoft to disclose information that it refused to supply and allow 
its use for the development of compatible products.60  Also, regarding tying 
practices, the decision required Microsoft to provide a version of Windows 
that does not include WMP.61  Thus, OEMs and consumers are left with the 
                                                 
53  Jube Shiver Jr., Microsoft Settlement Is Questioned; Appeals Court Judges Express Concern 
About The Lack Of Competition Two Years After Antitrust Pact Was Struck, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2003 
(quoting Judge Kuney’s statement). 
54  The EC Decision Against Microsoft: Windows on the World, Glass Houses, or Through the 
Looking Glass?, THE ANTITRUST SOURCE, Sept. 2004, at 10, available at http:// 
www.abanet.org/antitrust/source/09-04/Sep04MSBB.pdf [hereinafter “Windows on the World”]. 
55  Commission Decision, art. 3 at 299 (“For the infringement referred to in Article 2, a fine of EUR 
497,196,304 is imposed on Microsoft Corporation.”). 
56  Id. ¶ 3. 
57  Id.  
58  Id. ¶ 5. 
59  Id. at art. 2. 
60  Id. at art. 5. 
61  Id. at art. 6. 
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choice between “the bundled version” of Windows and the “unbundled 
version” of Windows.62  It should be noted that “the E.C. did not prevent 
Microsoft from offering” Windows bundled with WMP, although the 
decision asserted that “Microsoft must not circumvent the decision by 
engaging in technical or economic tying.”63 
There is no doubt that such “mandatory versioning”64 is a stronger 
remedy than the mere icon-hiding of the U.S. settlement decree.  However, it 
is unclear whether the E.C. remedy is truly strong enough to be effective in 
achieving its purpose.  For example, OEMs will not be given sufficient 
incentive to purchase an unbundled version of Windows if it is priced 
identically to, but not lower than, the bundled version.65  Indeed, Microsoft 
said that it will sell the stripped-down Windows version (known as “Home 
Edition N”) for the same price as its normal program.66  Subsequently, Dell 
Incorporated and Hewlett-Packard Company, two of the world’s biggest 
personal-computer manufactures, expressed their displeasure with the E.C.’s 
order.67  Specifically, Dell said it did not plan to offer customers the version 
of Windows that does not include WMP. 68   Similarly, Hewlett-Packard 
Company stated that it expected minimal demand for the “N version” despite 
its availability to consumers.69 
Moreover, under the E.C. remedy, Microsoft is allowed to negotiate 
with OEMs to have the bundled version installed on desktops.70  Under these 
circumstances, other media players suffer relative disadvantage in 
distributing their products because of the ubiquity of Windows.71   With 
WMP already installed on the system, an OEM will focus on the incremental 
costs of adding a second media player.72  Indeed, such incremental costs, 
which consist mostly of additional technical support and training costs, were 
used by Microsoft as a barrier to entry against Netscape Navigator in the U.S 
web-browser market.73  In this way, other media player companies must 
negotiate with the OEMs to install their products in the bundled version of 
                                                 
62  Id.  
63  Oliver Sitar, The EU Microsoft Decision: Preserving Interoperability and Free Choice in Software 
Markets, MR-INT, 2004 (vol 1), at 5. 
64  Picker, supra note 1, at 203. 
65  Windows on the World, supra note 54, at 10. 
66  Josh Brown, EU's Microsoft Order Has Skeptics— Stripped-Down Windows Won't Be Offered by 
Dell; H-P Sees Little Demand, THE WALL ST. J., Apr. 1, 2005. 
67  Id. 
68  Id. 
69  Id. 
70  Picker, supra note 1, at 203-04. 
71  Id. at 203-05. 
72  Id. at 204. 
73  Id.  
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Windows. 74   Such a deal increases the distribution payment of those 
companies and worsens the under-distribution of other media players. 75  
Therefore, the E.C.’s mandatory versioning is not practically effective to 
eradicate the harms to Microsoft’s competitors caused by Microsoft’s illegal 
tying practices. 
V. THE KFTC’S CURRENT REMEDY IS THE SECOND-BEST POLICY 
In its decision against Microsoft, the KFTC followed a remedy similar 
to the E.C’s mandatory versioning by requiring Microsoft to separately 
produce another version of Windows from which the codes of WMP and 
WM are completely removed.  Also, it required Microsoft to create a 
supplemental program in the bundled version to help end-users download 
other competing products.  Compared to the remedies adopted by other 
courts, this measure seems to be a more effective approach to remedy the 
violation and promote fair competition.  The KFTC’s measure, however, is 
still unlikely to completely eradicate the wrongs of Microsoft’s tying 
practices. 
A. The KFTC’s Remedy Makes Remarkable Progress, but is Still 
Imperfect 
As briefly mentioned, the KFTC’s remedy is distinguishable from 
other decisions announced by the U.S. and E.C.  In regard to WMS, the 
KFTC took a different direction than the E.C.’s mandatory versioning or the 
icon-hiding remedy of the U.S. cases.  The KFTC clearly ordered that 
Microsoft unbundle WMS from Windows.76  While the U.S. decision only 
required hiding the icons of the programs, the KFTC ordered Microsoft to 
completely remove WMS’ codes from Windows.77  Moreover, under the 
KFTC’s decision, Microsoft cannot provide WMS with any version of 
Windows.78  For example, the KTFC strictly ordered that Microsoft not 
distribute WMS in any other form, including as separate CD ROMs, 
updates, download links or advertisements on Windows Operating System 
                                                 
74  Of course, the competing products may not be installed to the unbundled version without 
Microsoft’s products.  
75  Picker, supra note 1, at 205. 
76  Holding, art. 1, § A. 
77   Holding, art. 1, § A(1) (“The Commission will determine the range of source codes and files 
which shall not be included so as to unbundle WMS from the Windows Server Operating System, within 
60 days of the date of this order, taking into account the examinees’ opinions.”). 
78  Id. at § B (“After 180 days of this order, the examinees shall sell and distribute WMS in a way 
separate from Windows Sever Operating System . . .”). 
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package.79  Such a complete separation is a stronger measure than the E.C.’s 
mandatory versioning and is also the simplest way to root out the problems 
of illegal tying.80  
As to the WMP and WM, however, the KFTC adopted a remedy 
similar to the E.C.’s mandatory versioning.  The KFTC ordered that 
Microsoft “shall not tie Windows Media Player . . . and Messenger . . . to the 
Windows Personal Computer . . . Operating System . . . . However, apart 
from foregoing remedies . . . . [Microsoft] may provide WMP 
and . . . Messenger tied to PC Operating System as currently provided.”81  
More importantly, echoing the E.C.’s decision, the KFTC did not require 
different pricing between the bundled and unbundled versions of Windows.  
Thus, just as in the E.C.’s decision, this remedy is not likely to give OEMs 
sufficient incentive to purchase an unbundled version.  In other words, if the 
unbundled version is provided at the same price as (or at least not lower 
than) the bundled version, end-users and OEMs have little to no incentive to 
buy the unbundled version. 
The KFTC advocates that its remedy is distinguishable from that of 
the E.C. because it requires separating WMP as well as WM.82  The KFTC 
argues that many companies will prefer the unbundled version without the 
instant messenger in order to enhance the company’s network security and 
work efficiency.83  Also, taking the potential defects of mandatory versioning 
into consideration, the KFTC required the bundled version to be equipped 
with a certain supplemental device.  That is, the KFTC ordered Microsoft to 
“install and operate ‘Media Player Centre’ and ‘Messenger Centre’ in the 
‘bundled PC Operating System,’” 84  through which Windows users can 
easily download other competing products.  The KFTC explained that such a 
requirement guarantees equal opportunity for competitors as well as 
consumers to choose the product they want, even in the bundled version.85  
With regard to Microsoft’s new Windows Operating System, Windows Vista, 
Microsoft was obligated to “provide devices . . . to readily download the 
                                                 
79  Id. at § B(1)-(4). 
80
  정영진, MS [Youngjin Jung], 사건의 국제 경쟁법적 의의 [The Implication of Microsoft Case in 
International Competition Law], 경쟁저널 [COMPETITION JOURNAL], Vol. 125 at 63, Feb.-Mar. 2006  (S. 
Korea) (the title translated by this author) [hereinafter, Youngjin Jung]. 
81  Holding, Art. 2, § A. 
82  Park Jung-Won, supra note 34, at 45. 
83  Id. at 47-48. 
84  See Holding, art. 2, § C(1).  It is also interesting to note that the KFTC ordered Microsoft to 
provide service packs or updates which include those other competing products even to the users of 
existing Windows PC operating systems, apart from the bundled/unbundled versions provided.  See 
Holding, art. 2, § D. 
85  Park Jung-Won, supra note 34, at 46. 
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streaming media players of other businesses which have their own formats 
when providing the ‘bundled [version].’” 86   Certainly, through those 
supplemental devices, other media players and messenger companies may be 
able to alleviate their disadvantage in distribution.  Unlike the E.C.’s remedy, 
competitors can lower the additional costs for distribution since Microsoft’s 
bundled version will guide users to readily download those competitors’ 
software. 
However, it is likely that even though “Media Player/Messenger 
Centre” will alleviate the under-distribution of other competing media 
players and instant messaging products, Microsoft will continue to occupy 
an advantageous position in distribution.  When competing products are not 
installed on Windows by default, the significant portion of consumers who 
are already accustomed to the existing desktop environment organized with 
WMP and WM are unlikely to download other competing products.87  As in 
the browser market, “most consumers become wedded to the first products 
to which they are exposed. . . . ”88  In other words, any forms of “first-
sighting” are “important market movers.”89  Therefore, the KFTC’s remedy 
with the “Media/Messenger Centre” remains an imperfect measure.  As 
suggested below, the KFTC could have adopted better measures to curb 
Microsoft’s monopoly and restore fair competition: a “must-carry” remedy. 
B. The KFTC Could Have Adopted a Must-Carry Measure 
There was a wide range of remedies from which the KFTC could 
choose in deciding the Microsoft case.  There are three remedial options 
which seem most applicable in this case: complete unbundling, mandatory 
versioning, and a must-carry remedy.  Among the three options, the must-
carry remedy is most likely to mitigate the disadvantage that Microsoft’s 
competitors face in distributing their software as discussed below. 
1. Complete Unbundling 
First, the KFTC could have adopted a narrow corrective measure to 
simply require that end-users or OEMs be free to remove access to WMP 
and WM while leaving the codes of those programs intact.  The same 
remedy was already used in the U.S. to remedy Microsoft’s practice of 
                                                 
86  Holding, art. 2, § C(2). 
87  Youngjin Jung, supra note  80, at 65.  
88  Charles A. James, The Real Microsoft Case and Settlement, 16 ANTITRUST 58, 59 (Fall, 2001). 
89  Id. at 60. 
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bundling Internet Explorer to Windows.90  As discussed above, however, this 
measure has proven ineffective in alleviating the distribution disadvantage of 
other competing web browsers.  With this option, a similar problem will 
occur in the market for media players.  For example, Microsoft’s distribution 
advantage91 incurred by the existence of the remaining software codes can 
give content providers and software developers a strong incentive to use 
media platforms based on WMP.92  Therefore, the remedy will be more 
effective if it requires Microsoft to remove the computer codes of the tied 
products from the operating system.  The KFTC adopted this option to 
completely unbundle WMS from Windows Server Operating System. 93  
However, such complete unbundling requires Microsoft to redesign its 
software products, the codes of which are tightly commingled with 
Windows.  For this reason, the U.S. and E.C were reluctant to apply this 
remedy to their cases. 94   The KFTC also seemed hesitant to take this 
intrusive redesigning measure on every issue involved. 95 
2. Mandatory Versioning 
Alternatively, the KFTC could mandate broader conduct relief.  To 
restore the market to a pre-bundling competitive condition, “an additional 
affirmative remedy would be necessary to ‘kick-start’ the market into 
competition.”96  This type of remedy could include “fencing in” remedies 
such as a bundling prohibition under which Microsoft may be permitted to 
bundle WMP only if it also offers a practical unbundled alternative.97  This 
                                                 
90   See Sue Ann Mota supra note 47, at 189; see also Microsoft Corp., 231 F. Supp. 2d at 177. 
91  Even in consideration of internet downloads, the evidence in E.C.’s Microsoft case suggests that 
Microsoft still enjoys a powerful distributional advantage over its software competitors.  In other words, 
“Microsoft can easily make software present by just folding new software into Windows.”  Picker, supra 
note 1, at 199; See also Commission Decision,  ¶ 842. 
92  Youngjin Jung, supra note 80, at 63.  See also Picker, supra note 1, at 203-04. 
93  Holding, art. §1(A). 
94  In New York v. Microsoft Corp., the court noted: 
The case law is unwavering in the admonition that it is not a proper task for the Court to 
undertake to redesign products.  ‘Antitrust scholars have long recognized the undesirability of 
having courts oversee product design’ . . . . Accordingly, even if Plaintiffs had presented 
evidence sufficient to support their request that the Court require Microsoft to remove code 
from its products, the Court would be appropriately reluctant to enter a remedy that requires 
Microsoft to completely redesign its Windows products and places the Court in the role of 
scrutinizing whether Microsoft has done so without degradation of the ultimate product. 
224 F.Supp.2d 76, 158 (D.D.C., 2001) (internal citation omitted).   
95  Picker supra note 1, at 203. 
96   R. Craig Romaine & Steven C. Salop, Slap Their Wrists? Tie Their Hands? Slice Them into 
Pieces? Alternative Remedies for Monopolization in the Microsoft Case, 13 ANTITRUST ABA 15, 16-17 
(1999).  
97  Id. at 15 
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broader conduct relief is found in the E.C.’s remedy of mandatory 
versioning.  But, as already pointed out, without creating a price gap 
between the two versions, there is little incentive for the consumers to buy 
the unbundled version in the relevant market.98  One might argue that such 
mandatory versioning could be improved by mandating a substantial price 
difference between the two versions.  However, mandating such different 
pricing is not an easy task:  it is difficult to calculate the market price of the 
tied products (here, WMP and WM) which are partly integrated into the 
operating system, and generally provided without charging additional fees to 
consumers.99  Accordingly, if the KFTC had adopted this remedy, it would 
likely face the same problems that occurred in the E.C case. 
3. Must-Carry Remedy 
In order to avoid the problems of the potential remedies above, the 
KFTC could have adopted another available option.  That is, a must-carry 
remedy, under which Microsoft would have to install one or more competing 
media players and messengers on the bundled version of Windows as the 
default.  Even though some argue that the “Media/Messenger Centre” 
requirement has a similar function as the must-carry remedy, such a quasi 
must-carry remedy is not as effective as a pure must-carry option in giving 
end-users equal opportunities to use competing products. 100   Because 
competing products are already installed as default under the pure must-
carry option, we can expect that the end-users will have natural chances to 
use those competing programs at first sight.  Accordingly, the must-carry 
remedy would directly mitigate the current distribution advantage of 
Microsoft by placing competing products at the same starting point with 
WMP and WM.101  It would also lessen the market power that is exercised 
by OEMs in the deals that they strike to distribute software.102 
The core disadvantage of the must-carry option is the concern about 
the selection of products which will be loaded to the tying product.103  This 
was the one reason that a similar remedy was rejected in the U.S. case. 104  
                                                 
98  Brown, supra note 66. 
99  Youngjin Jung, supra note 80, at 64. 
100  See discussion, infra Part V.B. 
101  Picker, supra note 1, at 205. 
102  Id.  
103  Id.; see also Willard K. Tom, Remedying the Irremediable: The Government’s Dilemma in the 
Microsoft Case, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Nov. 2001, at 2, available at  http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/source/ 
11-01/dilemma.pdf. 
104  See Massachusetts v. Microsoft Corp., 373 F.3d 1199, 1239-40 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (quoting the 
statement from the Department of Justice to explain its decision not to pursue the States’ proposed Java 
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But the KFTC could use an approval mechanism of the sort used in 
divestiture orders in the U.S. 105   In order to ensure that the strong 
competitors are carried and to limit the must-carry obligation to those 
competitors, the approving authority such as a court and the KFTC could 
rely on objective criteria such as market shares or the number of users.106  
Indeed, the KFTC already set forth specific standards to select the 
competing products that will be listed in the “Media/Messenger Centre.”  
The decision specified the three categories of the standard: “the streaming 
media players from the . . . businesses possessing the basic technology, icons 
of messengers from businesses having more than five percent of market 
shares in net users per month” and “icons of ‘Media Player Web Centre’ and 
the ‘Messenger Web Centre’”.107   Because such a definite standard was 
already established, the KFTC could apply it to launch a pure must-carry 
remedy.  It would have been a better remedy for the KFTC to require 
Microsoft to install every entry at default that will be included in the 
“Media/Messenger Centre.” 
C. The KFTC’s Current “Media/Messenger Centre” Requirement Seems 
to be the Second-Best Alternative 
Although a pure must-carry remedy could be the most effective 
measure as suggested above, the KFTC’s “Media/Messenger Centre” is the 
second-best measure available since the economic interests of concerned 
parties does not permit the pre-installation of competing products.  In fact, 
every concerned party seemed reluctant to accept the pure must-carry 
measure.  When designing the current remedy, the KFTC considered each 
party’s costs and benefits involved in adopting the must-carry remedy.108  In 
fact, the KFTC recognized that there would be some negative impacts on the 
related parties by pre-installing competing software codes in the bundled 
version of Windows.109  For example, if Microsoft carries competing media 
players and instant messengers in its operating system, Microsoft will have 
                                                                                                                                               
must-carry provision: “[I]t is not the proper role of the government to bless one competitor over others, or 
one potential middleware platform over others.”). 
105  Willard K Tom, supra note 105, at 3. 
106  Id. 
107  Holding, art. 2, § C(2)(a).  See also Holding, art. 2, § C(1)(c) (“The examinees shall connect the 
users to the said businesses or the Web Center’s websites so that the users can download desired programs, 
when the users click on the icons of each program which appear following the clicks on Media/Messenger 
Centre, or when the users click on the icons of Media/Messenger Web Centre.”). 
108  E-mail from 이병건[Lee Byung-Geon], an administrative officer in charge of the Microsoft case in 
the KFTC, to the author (Nov. 20, 2006, 00:38:03 PST) (on file with the Journal). 
109  Id. 
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to bear responsibility for legal consequences arising from those pre-installed 
software.110  In other words, if the pre-installed software malfunctions or is 
involved in a legal complaint concerning copyrights or intellectual property 
rights, Microsoft would also be heavily obliged to fix such problems.111  To 
clear up those potential legal problems, Microsoft and OEMs would have to 
thoroughly examine the source codes of the software that would be loaded to 
Windows.  Such a rigorous inspection could be expected to burden both 
Microsoft and OEMs with high additional costs.112  At this point, because the 
KFTC took into account such negative impacts on the OEMs, and not on 
Microsoft, it was reluctant to adopt the pure must-carry remedy. 113 
Moreover, Microsoft’s competing software makers expressed 
concerns about exposing their software’s source codes to Microsoft and 
other third parties through the process of inspections as described above.114  
Also, they worried that if Microsoft was given discretionary power in 
designing the must-carry version of Windows, the pre-installed software 
could be arbitrarily modified.115 
Computer manufacturers were also reluctant to follow the pure must-
carry remedy.116  If they sell computers designed for the must-carry version 
of Windows, they will have to provide after-sale service on the pre-installed 
programs.117  Such additional after-sale service obligations would burden the 
manufacturers with incremental costs.  Due to the highly competitive nature 
of computer markets, such increased costs would in turn significantly 
compromise the manufacturers’ profit margins.  Therefore, even though a 
pure must-carry option provides consumers with full equal opportunities to 
use competing products, the KFTC decided not to impose such a remedy on 
Microsoft.118  
Yet the KFTC explained that although the pure must-carry remedy is 
excluded, the “Media/Messenger Centre” will have a very similar effect as 
the must-carry alternative.119  Because of the ubiquitous high-speed internet 
connections in Korea,120 such link icons on the screen are likely to give 
                                                 
110  Id. 
111  Id. 
112  Id. 
113  Id.  See also another e-mail from Lee Byung-Geon (Feb. 6, 2007, 06:05:25 PST) (on file with the 
Journal). 
114  Id. 
115  Id. 
116  Id. 
117  Id. 
118  Id. 
119  Id. 
120  Don Kirk, Technology; In Korea, Broadband Is Part of the Culture, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2001, 
C3. 
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Windows users a similar impression and recognition like those of pre-
installed software.121 
In sum, among the various remedial options available, the must-carry 
requirement against Microsoft would be the most effective way to give 
Windows users fully equal access to the competing products.  But as 
discussed above, practical difficulties exist in providing equal accessibility 
through requiring pre-installation of the competing software.  Thus, the 
“Media/Messenger Center,” which is expected to create similar (but still not 
equal) accessibility as the must-carry obligation, is an appropriate alternative 
as the next best option for the KFTC.   
VI. CONCLUSION 
Because the remedy phase of an antitrust case is crucial, 122  it is 
worthwhile to evaluate the effectiveness of the remedy adopted after the 
finding of antitrust violations.  In the U.S., the function of the remedy (in 
civil cases) is to “restore the market to the condition it would have enjoyed 
had there been no violation, and to deter future violation.” 123   Such a 
remedial purpose seems consistent with that of Korea and Europe, because 
the competition laws of those countries share a similar underlying goal: the 
protection of fair market competition.124 
Microsoft’s tying practices in relation to its operating systems and 
applications have been condemned as a violation of antitrust laws in various 
parts of the world.  While courts have ordered diverse remedies against 
Microsoft, such measures have not effectively eliminated the unfair 
competitive advantage that Microsoft enjoys.  The D.C. District Court’s 
settlement measure requiring hiding icons without code removal was not a 
meaningful measure to mitigate the distribution disadvantage of Microsoft’s 
competitors.  On the other hand, while the E.C.’s mandatory versioning was 
a more effective remedy than that of the U.S., it is still defective due to the 
lack of different pricing between the bundled and unbundled versions.  In 
this regard, the KFTC’s idea of “Media/Messenger Centre” is the most 
effective remedy so far because it lessens Microsoft’s relative advantage in 
distribution obtained by bundling its application programs with Windows.   
                                                 
121  Id. 
122  ELEANOR M. FOX ET AL., U.S. ANTITRUST IN GLOBAL CONTEXT, 186 (2nd ed. 2004). 
123  Id. 
124  Youngjin Jung, supra note 80, at 69;  See also Per Jebsen & Robert Stevens, Assumptions, Goals 
and Dominant Undertakings: The Regulation of Competition Under Article 86 of the European Union, 64 
ANTITRUST L.J 443, 443 (1996). 
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One might argue that the KFTC’s remedy is still unsatisfactory relief 
to harmed competitors because it does not require Microsoft to pre-install 
the competing products by default.  In other words, the KFTC could impose 
a must-carry obligation on Microsoft because such an obligation could 
neutralize Microsoft’s ability to tie WMP and WM to Windows.  However, 
such a pure must-carry obligation may not have been able to survive the 
potential legal and economic problems that would arise when the competing 
software gets commingled with the codes of Windows.  Therefore, the 
KFTC’s “Media/Messenger Centre” holding appears to be the second-best 
alternative to remedy Microsoft’s anticompetitive violations while 
preserving as many aspects of the pure must-carry remedy as possible.
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1.  TYING WINDOWS MEDIA SERVICE 
 
A.  Within 180 days of the notification date of this cease and desist order 
(hereinafter referred to as “date of this order”), the examinees shall not tie 
Windows Media Service (hereinafter referred to as “WMS”, including all 
the programs that perform the same or equivalent functions; hereinafter 
                                                 
125  Translators’ Note:  The translation for this article only includes the "Jumun" ("주문") part of the 
whole opinion.  Microsoft Decision, supra, note 3 at 1.  In general, the "Jumun" means the text of a judicial 
decision which briefly summarizes a legal determination and the remedies imposed in a case.  In this case, 
however, the “Jumun” only contains the remedies imposed against the examinee Microsoft.  Here, I 
translated the "Jumun" as “holding” in English, taking into consideration the characteristics and purpose of 
the full opinion. 
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the same shall apply) to the Windows Server Operating System (including 
Windows Server Operating System, regardless of the names, which 
examinees will develop and sell from now on, Windows Server 2003 and 
all the other older versions). 
 
(1)  The Commission will determine the range of source codes and files 
which shall not be included so as to unbundle WMS from the Windows 
Server Operating System, within 60 days of the date of this order, 
taking into account the examinees’ opinions. 
 
(2)  The examinees shall submit a list of the source codes of each 
version and a detailed report of each file which cannot be included in 
accordance with subsection (1) above in the Windows Server Operating 
Systems that will be developed from now on, within 60 days before the 
commencement of sale. 
 
B.  After 180 days of this order, the examinees shall sell and distribute 
WMS in a way separate from Windows Sever Operating System, and 
shall not perform any acts that might harm the separate sale and 
distribution of WMS.  Any of the following shall be prohibited: 
 
(1)  The act of providing Windows Server Operating System packages 
which include a compact disk (hereinafter, referred to as “CD”) that 
includes WMS or equivalent programs; or providing the service packs 
or updates, which include WMS, of the Windows Server Operating 
System.  
 
(2)  The act of providing WMS download link on Windows Server 
Operating System, the subsequent service packs or the updates. 
 
(3)  The act of having display or advertisement that induces, or might 
induce, installation or use of WMS in Windows Server Operating 
System, the subsequent service packs or the updates. 
 
(4)  The act of setting up WMS as a default installation not through the 
direct decision of users (including consumers, manufacturers and 
distributors; hereinafter the same shall apply), 
 
C.  The examinees shall assure that the performance and stability of the 
Windows Server Operating System which follows the measures of section 
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A is not inferior to the version which does not follow the measures; and 
that, when the source codes and files excluded under the measures of 
section A get installed to the Windows Server Operating System, the 
System shall perform as if it has originally built-in such codes and files. 
 
D.  In relationship with server manufacturers, the examinees shall not 
perform any of the following: 
 
(1)  The act of trading on the conditions of providing, distributing, 
renting, promoting, using, installing or supporting only WMS; the act 
of providing economic or non-economic benefits such as payment in 
return of such conditions, reducing the price of Windows Server 
Operating System and creating favorable terms and conditions of 
businesses. 
 
(2)  The act of retaliation, or giving notice of retaliation, regardless of 
its forms thereof, such as reducing or suspending the offer of economic 
or non-economic benefits for the reason that the server manufacturers 
attempt to provide, distribute, rent, promote, use, install or support 
other software which is competing with WMS. 
 
2.  TYING WINDOWS MEDIA PLAYER AND MESSENGER 
 
A.  After 180 days of the date of this order, the examinees shall not tie 
Windows Media Player (hereinafter referred to as “WMP”; including its 
successors and all of the examinees’ programs, regardless of their names, 
which perform the same or equivalent functions of WMP) and Messenger 
(Windows Messenger, MSN Messenger and all of the examinees’ 
programs, regardless of their names, which perform the same or 
equivalent functions; hereinafter referred to as “the examinees’ 
Messenger”) to the Windows Personal Computer (hereinafter referred to 
as “PC”) Operating System (including Windows XP, Windows Vista, 
other older versions and every Windows PC Operating System, regardless 
of its name, which examinees will develop and sell from now on; herein 
after the same shall apply): hereinafter, referred to as “unbundled PC 
Operating System.”  However, apart from the foregoing remedies, if the 
examinees follow the measures specified in section C below in regard to 
the competing products, they may provide WMP and the examinees’ 
Messenger tied to the PC Operating System as currently provided 
(hereinafter, referred to as “bundled PC Operating System”) in addition to 
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the “unbundled PC Operating System.”  Regarding the examinees’ certain 
versions of the Operating System deemed to have had substantially low 
market shares of less than 5 percent at the end of previous year, the 
Commission may withdraw all or part of this order upon the examinees’ 
request after the date of this order, taking into account the degree of 
competition restoration, the burden of examinees and their expected 
position in the future market. 
 
(1)  As to “the unbundled PC Operating System,” the methods and 
procedures set forth under section B below apply. 
 
(2)  As to the “bundled PC Operating system,” the methods and 
procedures set forth under section C below apply. 
 
B.  The examinees shall be subject to the following when providing 
“unbundled PC Operating System.” 
 
(1)  In order to provide “unbundled PC Operating System,” the 
examinees are obliged to unbundle WMP and the examinees’ 
Messenger from the existing Windows PC Operating System. 
 
(a)  The Commission will determine the range of source codes and 
files which shall not be included so as to unbundle WMP and the 
examinees’ Messenger from Windows PC Operating System, within 
60 days of the date of this order, taking into account the examinees’ 
opinions. 
 
(b)  The examinees shall submit a list of the source codes of each 
version and a detailed report of each file which cannot be included 
under subsection (1) above, within 60 days before the 
commencement of sale. 
 
(2)  After 180 days of this order, the examinees shall sell and distribute 
WMP and the examinees’ Messenger in a way that is separate from the 
“unbundled PC Operating System,” and shall not perform acts that 
might harm the separate sale and distribution of WMP and the 
examinees’ Messenger.  Any of the following shall be prohibited: 
 
(a)  The act of providing the “unbundled PC Operating System” 
packages which include a CD that includes WMP or the examinees’ 
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Messenger or equivalent programs; or providing the service packs or 
updates, which include WMP or the examinees’ Messenger, of the 
“unbundled PC Operating System.” 
 
(b)  The act of providing a download link for WMP and the 
examinees’ Messenger in the “unbundled PC Operating System” or 
its service packs or updates. 
 
(c)  The act of having display or advertisement that induces, or might 
induce, installation or use of WMP or the examinees’ Messenger in 
the “unbundled PC Operating System,” its service packs or updates. 
 
(d)  The act of setting up as a default installation, WMP, digital 
audio or video format which the examinees possess, Digital Rights 
Management (hereinafter referred to as “DRM”), codec, the 
examinees’ Messenger or communication protocols for the use of the 
Messenger in the “unbundled PC Operating System,” its service 
packs or updates, not through the direct decision of users. 
 
(3)  The examinees shall assure that the performance and stability of 
the “unbundled PC Operating System” which follows the measures of 
subsection (1) above is not inferior to the version which does not 
follow the measures; and that, even when the source codes and files 
excluded under the measures of subsection (1) above get installed to the 
“unbundled PC Operating System,” the System shall perform as if it 
has originally built-in such codes and files. 
 
C.  The examinees shall be subject to the following when providing 
“bundled PC Operating System”: 
 
(1)  Examinees shall install and operate “Media Player Centre” and 
“Messenger Centre” (hereinafter referred to as “Media/Messenger 
Center” when indicating both) in the “bundled PC Operating System” 
according to each of the following; and the Media/Messenger Centre 
shall provide users with substantial opportunities to download 
competing products as required below. 
 
(a)  The icons and menus of Media/Messenger Centre shall be placed 
where users can readily recognize, for example, the program menu 
list or the desktop of the “bundled PC Operating System”; they shall 
398 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 16 NO. 2 
 
maintain the same or similar sizes and forms as those of 
corresponding menus or icons (hereinafter referred to as “icons”) of 
WMP and Windows Messenger. 
 
(b)  The Media/Messenger Centre, when users click on its icons, 
shall include, among the streaming media players or instant 
messengers (hereinafter, referred to as “messengers”) provided in 
this country, the streaming media players from the Commission-
recognized businesses possessing the original technology; 126  and 
icons from businesses having more than 5 percent of market shares 
in net users per month as reported by the Commission-recognized 
market research groups as of the date of this order; and icons of 
“Media Player Web Centre” and the “Messenger Web Centre” 
(hereinafter, referred to as “Media/Messenger Web Centre” when 
indicating both) of the said businesses. 
 
(c)  The examinees shall connect the users to the said businesses or 
the Web Centre’s websites so that the users can download desired 
programs, when the users click on the icons of each program which 
appear following the clicks on Media/Messenger Centre, or when the 
users click on the icons of Media/Messenger Web Centre. 
 
(d)  When the businesses providing streaming media players or 
messengers do not want to have their products included in the 
Media/Messenger Centre, or the businesses demand substantially 
unfair conditions such as requesting the payment in return or waiving 
the responsibility of a surety, the examinees may request the 
Commission to exclude the products from the Media/Messenger 
Centre.  In that case, the Commission may remove from the 
Media/Messenger Centre even the products which are subject to 
C(1)(b) of this section. 
 
(e)  After 1 year of this order, the Commission, upon the interested 
parties’ request, may change the list of the media players and 
messengers which shall be included in the “Media/Messenger 
Centre,” taking into account the fluctuations of the market conditions. 
                                                 
126  The “original technology” is the term translated from “Won Cheon Gi Sul (원천기술).”  Microsoft 
Decision, supra, note 3 at 6 (“Won Cheon Gi Sul” is the term representing a technology which is regarded to 
be original and first, without rivals.  Sometimes, a patent acquisition determines whether one has the 
original technology.). 
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(f)  Within 60 days of this order, the Commission shall determine the 
range of streaming media players and messengers of which icons are 
placed in the Media/Messenger Centre as well as the details of the 
registration process and the operation of the Centre. 
 
(2)  As to Windows Vista (including every Windows PC Operating 
System and its older versions which are sold as successors to Windows 
XP, regardless of their names; hereinafter the same shall apply), the 
examinees shall provide devices as follows for users to readily 
download the streaming media players of other businesses which have 
their own formats, when providing the “bundled PC Operation 
System.” 
 
(a)  The examinees shall allow other Commission-recognized 
businesses possessing basic technology to register their own formats 
in accordance with the reasonable conditions set by the examinees 
upon the Commission’s approval.  If there is concern for disclosing 
the source codes or other trade secrets of the businesses due to the 
registration of their formats, the Commission shall determine the 
measures to resolve the concern taking into account those 
businesses’ opinions. 
 
(b)  When users want to play the Internet streaming contents or the 
contents saved in the users’ hard-disk or CD ROM written in 
different formats, and when the software that can play such contents 
is not registered in the Windows PC Operating System, the 
examinees shall connect the users to those media player businesses 
so as to download the software needed to play those contents. 
 
(c)  Within 90 days of the date of this order or the date of launching 
Windows Vista’s beta version, whichever is later, the examinees 
shall disclose on the Internet a detailed document describing the 
instructions and the contents of the devices which the examinees will 
provide. 
 
(3)  From the point when the examinees are commercially and 
technically able to begin mutual communication with other messenger 
businesses under reasonable terms and conditions, the examinees shall 
make good faith efforts to create an agreement (hereinafter, referred to 
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as “mutual compatibility agreement”) on which domestic MSN users 
can mutually communicate with the users of other messengers. 
 
(a)  Within 120 days of this order, so as to make a mutual 
compatibility agreement, the examinees shall begin to consult with 
messenger businesses possessing more than 5 percent of market 
shares in net users per month as reported by the Commission-
recognized market research groups as of the date of this order. 
However, the examinees may not consult with those who manifest 
intent not to make the mutual compatibility agreement. 
 
(b)  Every 6 months after the beginning of consultation for the 
mutual compatibility agreement, the examinees shall report to the 
Commission the progress of the consultation. 
 
(4)  The examinees shall assure that the performance and stability of 
the “bundled PC Operating System” which follows the measures of 
subsection (1) or (3) is not inferior to the version which does not follow 
the measures. 
 
D.  Within 180 days of this order, the examinees themselves, or through a 
third party, shall provide the users of the existing Windows PC Operating 
System, which is not subject to Section A or B above, with service packs 
which include products competing with WMP or the examinees’ 
messengers; and shall provide, through Windows updates (including 
updates for Windows PC Operating System, WMP and Windows 
messengers), the Media/Messenger Centre as set forth in C(1) above. 
 
(1)  When the service packs are distributed in a form of CD, the 
programs which will be included in the CD shall be determined in 
accordance with C(1)(b) above.   
 
(2)  Taking into account the examinees’ opinions, the Commission 
shall determine the details as to the enforcement of this order such as 
the range of supports and surety responsibilities of each business which 
manufactures the said CD and provides the programs in the CD. 
 
(3)  As to the updates in accordance with the subsection (1) above, the 
examinees shall announce the fact that they distribute the CDs at their 
own expense and that any users who want the CDs may apply for them; 
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and shall provide the CDs to the applicants for free within 1 year of this 
order. 
 
E.  The examinees shall not tie WMP or the examinees’ Messenger to the 
examinees’ other products which have more than 50 percent of national 
market shares in sales as of the date of this order, such as Microsoft 
Office, Microsoft Word, Microsoft PowerPoint and Microsoft Excel; and 
shall not perform other conduct which corresponds to such tying.  The 
specific ranges of the examinees’ other products shall be determined by 
the Commission within 90 days of this order.127 
 
F.  Via the Microsoft Developer Network (hereinafter, referred to as 
“MSDN”), the examinees shall provide PC manufacturers (including 
distributors; hereinafter, the same shall apply), related hardware 
businesses (meaning independent hardware businesses which develop PCs 
bundled with Windows PC Operating System or the hardware which is 
included or used with server computers that carry server operating 
systems within the country; hereinafter, the same shall apply), software 
developers (meaning businesses other than the examinees which develop 
or sell software products within the country; hereinafter, the same shall 
apply), the Internet service providers (meaning businesses which provide 
the Internet connection services to the domestic consumers, whether or 
not they posses their own contents; hereinafter, the same shall apply) and 
the Internet contents businesses (meaning domestic businesses which 
provide contents to the Internet users within the country by running 
websites; hereinafter, the same shall apply) with the following: the 
Application Programming Interfaces (meaning interfaces [including 
related callback interfaces] which WMP and Windows messengers make 
calls to so as to be given services from the Windows PC Operating 
System; hereinafter, referred to as “API”),  which WMP and Windows 
messengers use in order to interconnect and operate themselves with the 
Windows PC Operating System, and related documents (meaning all the 
information about identification and direction of APIs which is necessary 
for those who have common knowledge on the related field to effectively 
use the APIs) for the purpose of such interconnection and operation.  The 
APIs and the related documents shall be as accurate and specific as the 
APIs which are ordinarily made public in MSDN by the examinees; and 
                                                 
127  This section has been withdrawn as a result of Microsoft’s appeal brought to the Commission.  On 
June 16, 2006, the Commission published a ruling which specified that withdrawal.  In the Matter of the 
Appeal from Microsoft Corporation and Microsoft Korea, supra note 4 at 1. 
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shall be so prepared that users who have ordinary knowledge and 
capability regarding the industry have no difficulty in using them.  The 
information made public pursuant to this order shall be released until the 
final beta release of each product if the new main versions of WMP and 
Windows messengers are launched; either until more than 150,000 copies 
of beta versions are distributed or until the same number of copies are 
provided to the paid MSDN users, if the new version of Windows PC 
Operating System is launched. 
 
G.  In relationship with PC manufacturers, software developers, hardware 
businesses, the Internet service providers or the Internet contents 
businesses (hereinafter, all referred to as “PC manufacturers”), the 
examinees shall not perform any of the following:  
 
(1)  The PC manufacturers’ acts of trading on the conditions of 
providing, distributing, renting, promoting, using, installing or 
supporting only WMP, the examinees’ media formats, DRM, codec, the 
examinees’ messengers (hereinafter, all referred to as “WMP and the 
like”); or their acts of providing economic or non-economic benefits 
such as payment in return of such conditions, reducing the price of the 
Windows PC Operating System, creating favorable terms and 
conditions of businesses. 
 
(2)  The examinees’ acts of retaliation, or giving notice of retaliation, 
regardless of its forms thereof, such as reducing or suspending the offer 
of economic or non-economic benefits for the reason that the PC 
manufacturers attempt to provide, distribute, rent, promote, use, install 
or support other software which is competing with WMP and the like. 
 
3.  THE SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF THIS ORDER AS TO TIME AND 
TERRITORY 
 
A.  This order shall apply to all of the Windows Server Operating Systems 
and Windows PC Operating Systems which the examinees provide in 
Korea.  However, even if those products are provided within the country, 
this order shall not apply if it is evident that they will be exported to other 
countries. 
 
B.  This order shall remain in force for 10 years after the date of this order.  
However, the examinees may annually request the Commission to review 
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this order after 5 years of the date of this order. 
 
(1)  The Commission, upon the examinees’ request, may review the 
change of the market conditions, the status of competition and the like; 
and if a substantial improvement of the competition in the relevant 
market is recognized in the review as a result of the effective 
enforcement of this order, the Commission may withdraw or change all 
or part of this order. 
 
(2)  The effect of a withdrawal or change under subsection (1) above 
does not affect the examinees’ conduct performed prior to the 
withdrawal or change. 
 
4.  As to the enforcement of this order, the Commission shall determine the 
details to which this order does not specify within 120 days of the date of 
this order, taking into account the examinees’ opinions. 
 
5.  To determine specific technical measures necessary to enforce this order 
and ensure effective compliance with the order, the Commission may 
appoint a “Supervisory Board.”  The Board’s organization and the scope of 
its duties shall be determined by the Commission. 
 
6.  The Commission, upon the examinees’ request, may change the period of 
compliance if there is a reasonable ground. 
 
7.  When the Commission forms the measures taking into account the 
examinees’ opinions, they must cooperate with the Commission in good 
faith; if the examinees do not cooperate or submit false materials in violation 
of the principle of good faith, the Commission may waive the process of 
opinion collection set forth in this order. 
 
8.  The examinees must pay to the National Treasury the surcharges 
specified under each of the following. 
 
A.  Amount of Payment: a total of 32.49 billion won (27.23 billion won 
from Microsoft Corporation and 5 billion won from Microsoft Korea). 
 
(1)  For Tying WMS 
 
(a)  Examinee Microsoft Corporation: 626 million won 
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(b)  Examinee Microsoft Korea: 1.667 billion won 
 
(2)  For Tying WMP and the examinees’ messengers 
 
(a)  Examinee Microsoft Corporation: 26.604 billion won 
 
(b)  Examinee Microsoft Korea: 3.593 billion won 
 
B.  Payment Due: Within the period (60 days) specified in the payment 
notice. 
 
C.  Place to Pay: The Bank of Korea National Treasury Receipt Agency or 
a post office. 
